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Changing minds in a changing world
Wolfgang Schwarz∗
I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account
both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject’s location.
The rule combines standard conditioning with a “shifting” operation
that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next
point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments
for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information
is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other
recent proposals, what results it delivers for puzzles like the Sleeping
Beauty problem, and whether there are diachronic constraints on
rational belief at all.
1 Introduction
As we make our way through the universe – by walking around town, by orbiting
the sun, or simply by moving forward in time – we have to update our beliefs
to keep track of our changing location. Right now I believe that it is Monday;
sometime tonight, this attitude will fade and I will start believing that it is
Tuesday. Philosophers disagree on how to model this kind of belief change.
On the most straightforward account, we possess genuine information not only
about the universe as a whole, but also about where and when in the universe
we are. When the church bell strikes midnight, I can rule out alternative ways
things might have been – not for the universe, but for me, then: it might have
been earlier, or later.
∗ For helpful comments on earlier versions I would like to thank Jens Christian Bjerring,
David Chalmers, John Cusbert, Alan Hájek, Namjoong Kim, Stephan Leuenberger, Weng
Hong Tang, Michael Titelbaum, J. Robert G. Williams, two anonymous referees, and the
audience of a PhilSoc seminar at the Australian National University in February 2008.
Several points made in this paper, especially in section 6, are also made in [Meacham 2010],
which appeared while this paper was under review.
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A maximally specific way things might have been for an individual at a time
is a centered (possible) world. A less specific way – a centered proposition – can
be modelled as a class of centered worlds. As [Lewis 1979] points out, we don’t
need a special treatment for uncentered worlds and propositions, since every
way a universe might be determines a way things might be for an individual at a
time: to be such that the universe is so-and-so. From now on, when I use ‘world’
and ‘proposition’, I always mean centered worlds and centered propositions.
Since propositions (so understood) can change their truth value over time,
it is possible to believe a proposition A at one time and believe not-A at a
later time, and still think that the previous belief was true. Today’s belief that
it is Monday is not in tension with tomorrow’s belief that it is Tuesday. By
contrast, when we revise our beliefs in response to new information, we typically
consider our previous beliefs to be false, or less accurate. These two kinds of
belief change have been extensively studied in stochastic control theory and
the AGM school of formal epistemology (see e.g. [Kumar and Varaiya 1986],
[Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991]); outside these areas however, the update process
characteristic of “self-locating” beliefs is still largely ignored. Its relevance has
only recently surfaced in the wake of the Sleeping Beauty problem.
I will defend an update rule that incorporates both kinds of belief change,
loosely building on ideas from control theory. The rule combines conditioning
with a “shifting” operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility
forward to the next point where information arrives. Section 2 introduces
and motivates the basic proposal; section 3 looks at some consequences for an
agent’s attitude towards her past and future beliefs. In section 4, I show that
several traditional arguments for conditioning support the combination with
shifting once centered information is taken into account. Section 5 compares
my proposal to a different approach that has become popular in the Sleeping
Beauty debate. In section 6, I discuss a tension that arises between diachronic
constraints on rationality and the idea that rational belief cannot be constrained
by matters inaccessible to the subject.
Although I work in the centered worlds framework, my proposal should also
be useful in alternative frameworks. For instance, [Perry 1979] and others have
argued that belief should be understood as a three-place relation between a
subject, an uncentered content, and a mode of presentation which encodes
information about the subject’s location. To make sense of uncertainty and
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evidence about one’s location, degrees of belief should then be assigned not only
to contents, but also to modes. Given the familiar representation of modes as
functions from centered worlds to uncentered contents, a probability distribution
over modes (or mode-content pairs) determines a probability distribution over
centered worlds by diagonalisation. My proposal would then concern the
dynamics of these diagonal probabilities.
2 Shifted conditioning
In the centered worlds framework, a belief state is modelled by a probability
distribution over centered worlds. When new evidence comes in, this distribution
gets revised. The classical rule for such revisions, conditioning, presupposes that
the new evidence makes the subject certain of some evidence proposition E;
any other proposition A then gets its probability adjusted to its old probability
conditional on E:
(C) P2(A) = P1(A |E).
To see why this does not adequately handle centered information, consider a
simple example.
The Litmus Test. You dip a piece of white litmus paper into a
beaker which you suspect to contain acid. The paper turns red.
Let P1 be your credence function just before you see the paper turn red, and let
E be the information you then receive. P1 assigns high probability to worlds
where the paper is about to turn red and somewhat lower probability to worlds
where it is about to turn blue. Very low probability goes to worlds where
the paper has already turned red. Perhaps you cannot completely rule out
such worlds: you might be hallucinating that the paper is white. Perhaps you
can’t even rule out worlds where the paper looks red, so that you are somehow
mistaken even about the paper’s appearance. But if this is how things are, then
very strange things must be going on, involving evil demons or other malignant
forces.
A moment later, you observe that the paper is red. Conditioning would have
you move all your credence to worlds where the paper looks red, in proportion
to their previous probability. You would become convinced that very strange
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things are going on. Your actual response, of course, is to believe that it is now
somewhat later than before and that the paper has in the meantime turned
red. Conditioning is too conservative with your self-locating beliefs. Since you
expected the paper to turn red, you should not hold on to your belief that
either the paper is white or you are being fooled by evil demons. (Notice that
this problem does not exploit the assumption that agents are absolutely certain
about their present evidence.)
Conditioning is a reasonable strategy for revising beliefs about the world in
the light of new information about that same world. But as we move through
space and time, we leave our old (centered) worlds behind and enter new ones –
new worlds where what was true before may now be false. We need an update
policy that can take such changes into account.
Before I present my proposal, let me explain what I mean by an update policy.
Formally, an update policy is a mapping from a prior probability function P1
and an evidence proposition E to a posterior probability function P2. An agent
follows an update policy (at a given time) if her credence equals the result of
that function applied to her previous credence and her total new evidence. A
more general notion is required if the evidence does not confer certainty on any
proposition; I will return to such generalisations at the end of this section.
What is the agent’s ‘previous credence function’? It can’t be an arbitrary
credence from any earlier time. A policy that non-trivially operates on P1 will
likely yield different outputs when supplied with different inputs. Since there
can be only one new credence function P2, we should not allow P1 to come
from arbitrary earlier times. P1 should be the credence function from just
before the new evidence arrived. (“Just before” relative to the agent’s personal
time; for a time traveller, the “just before” state may lie in the distant past or
future.) When we discuss particular examples, we may of course ignore times
at which no information relevant to the propositions of interest arrives, just as
we commonly ignore irrelevant aspects of the total new evidence.
One could perhaps use arbitrary earlier credence if evidence was cumulative:
if later evidence always contained full information about all previous evidence,
including the order in which it arrived. But this is a rather unrealistic assump-
tion; I want to allow for agents who are not so fortunate as to always have
complete evidence about everything they have ever learnt.
What if there is a continuous stream of (relevant) evidence? That is, what if
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for any previous time there is an even closer time at which relevant information
arrives? If evidence does not accumulate over these intervals, we will miss
information, no matter which credence we take as P1. A discrete update model
can then only approximate the optimal update process. Again, for practical
applications, the approximation will often be good enough. But if we are
interested in the optimal update itself, we have to understand update policies
more generally as operations that map an old probability, a time interval and a
stream of evidence to a new probability. The policy I will defend can easily be
generalised in this way (along the lines of [LaValle 2006: 589–598]). For the
sake of simplicity, I will here stick to discrete updates.
So assume that for any centered world with positive credence, there is a
unique “next” point where (relevant) information arrives. Let ‘A’ express the
proposition that A will be true at the next point where evidence arrives: A is
true at world w iff A is true at the next point at w where information comes
in. On the policy I recommend, the new credence in A after learning E then
equals the previous conditional credence in A conditioned on E:
(SC) P2(A) = P1(A | E).
The shifting operator  induces a transformation on the space of probability
functions, mapping the credence P1 to the shifted credence P 1 , with P 1 (A) =
P1(A). Shifting and conditioning commute: if you first condition P1 on E
and then shift, the result is the same as if you first shift and then condition on E.
Hence the new credence also equals the shifted previous credence conditioned
on the new evidence:
(SC) P2(A) = P 1 (A |E).
If A is certain not to change its truth-value in the foreseeable future, then
P1(A) = P1(A). If both A and E have this property, then (SC) reduces to
(C). In this sense, (SC) is a generalisation of conditioning, adjusted to handle
transient propositions.
For a simple example, suppose at t1 you believe that the sun is shining, and
your evidence at t2 is neutral on this matter. Then at t2 you will believe that
the sun was shining just before the present evidence arrived. You do not hold
fixed your self-locating beliefs; you don’t assume that things are still exactly
the way they were before. Nor do you completely ignore those beliefs. You
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assume – tentatively, and subject to revision in the light of new evidence – that
the previous beliefs represent how things were a moment earlier.
Consider again The Litmus Test. Let t1 be the time when you start dipping
the paper. Suppose at this point, 60% of your credence P1 goes to worlds where
the liquid is an acid and 40% to other possibilities. Let’s say your credence that
the paper is about to turn red is 0.9 conditional on the first kind of situation, and
0.1 conditional on the second. By Bayes’ Theorem, your credence P1(A | R)
that the liquid is an acid given that it is about to turn red is
P1(A | R) = P1(R |A)× P1(A)
P1(R |A)× P1(A) + P1(R | ¬A)× P1(¬A)
= 0.9× 0.60.9× 0.6 + 0.1× 0.4
≈ 0.93.
Since you don’t assume that the liquid can change its acidity, this is also the
value of P1(A | R). So if at t2 your relevant new evidence is R, then by
(SC), your new credence in A is P2(A) = P1(A | R) ≈ 0.93. You end up
93% confident that the liquid is an acid. No probability is moved to evil demon
worlds.
It may help to picture this process in a table.
A&R ¬A&R A&¬R ¬A&¬R
0.6 A&¬R 0.9 0 0.1 0
0.4 ¬A&¬R 0 0.1 0 0.9
Shifting: 0.54 0.04 0.06 0.36
Conditioning: 0.93 0.07 0 0
The italicised values at the left are the old probabilities, the values at the bottom
the new ones. The body of the table (above the line) contains the transition
probabilities: the fraction of the old credence in the proposition marking the
row that gets transferred to the proposition marking the column. For example,
given that the liquid is an acid (we’re in the top row), the probability that
the present state will turn into one where the paper is red is 0.9. The values
in the ‘Shifting’ row are calculated by adding up the numbers in each column
multiplied by the old probability of the relevant row. Under ‘Conditioning’, the
possibilities that are ruled out by the evidence are set to zero and the other
probabilities renormalised.
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Transition probabilities are a familiar parameter in stochastic control theory,
but they play a slightly different role there (see e.g. [Kumar and Varaiya 1986],
[LaValle 2006: part III]). In control theory, subjective probability is defined
not over centered worlds, but over fragments of stages of worlds, called states.
States do not contain information about the past or the future. To evaluate
their options, agents therefore need not only a probability distribution over
states, but also an idea of how these states will evolve. This is represented by
the transition probabilities. In the present framework, transition probabilities
are derived values, determined by the ordinary subjective probabilities. If state
s0 could develop into s1 or s2, then we have two kinds of worlds all along, one
developing into s1 and one into s2. The transition probability between A and
B is simply the agent’s credence that B will be true at the next point when
information comes in given that A is true now.
Since shifted conditioning combines shifting with conditioning, it can easily be
adjusted to other revision rules. For example, suppose the new evidence deter-
mines a distribution of probabilities x1, . . . , xn over a partition of propositions
E1, . . . , En, rather than making any particular proposition certain. According
to Jeffrey conditioning (see [Jeffrey 1983: 164–169]), the new probability P2 is
then given by
(JC) P2(A) =
∑
i
P1(A |Ei)× xi.
Replacing the conditioning step in (SC) with Jeffrey conditioning, we get
(SJC) P2(A) =
∑
i
P1(A | Ei)× xi.
Similar adjustments are possible for other variations of conditioning.
If we skip the conditioning step and apply shifting directly to the shifted
probabilities, we get the double-shifted probability P 21 , the triple-shifted
probability P 31 , etc. Intuitively, P n1 (A) is the t1 credence that A will
be the case after n intakes of new information. I will write ‘n A’ for this
proposition (that A will be the case after n intakes of new information). So
P n1 (A) = P1(n A). As we will see next, P1(n A) is also the agent’s
expectation of her future credence in A.
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3 Shifted Reflection
Call an agent self-aware if she knows with certainty what update policy she
follows and what her present credence is. Self-aware agents who follow condi-
tioning have the characteristic property that their current credence matches
the expectation of their future credence (see [Goldstein 1983], [van Fraassen
1984]). This property is known as Reflection:
(R) P1(A) =
∑
x
P1(P2(A) = x)× x.
Informally, to satisfy Reflection means to trust one’s (expected) future judge-
ment. This kind of trust is evidently absurd if propositions can change their
truth-value: tomorrow I will probably believe that it is Tuesday, but this does
not mean that I should already believe now that it is Tuesday. If centered
propositions are in play, we have to distinguish between assuming that a belief
with content A is true, and assuming A. Trusting someone who believes that
it is Tuesday is to assume that their belief is true; but this is not the same as
assuming that it is Tuesday. If the trusted subject is known to be one day ahead,
it rather means assuming that it is Tuesday tomorrow. In general, to trust the
judgement of your successor is to satisfy a principle of Shifted Reflection:
(SR) P1(A) =
∑
x
P1(P2(A) = x)× x.
Shifted Reflection characterises self-aware agents who follow (SC).1
Like (R), (SR) contains ‘P2’ in the scope of ‘P1’. Since this is an intensional
context, it matters how P2 is presented. Suppose you are uncertain whether it
is Monday or Tuesday, and you know that on Wednesday morning you will next
find out what day it is. In fact it is Tuesday; so we can refer to tomorrow’s
credence as ‘your credence on Wednesday’. But on this way of presenting P2, you
do not satisfy (SR): your present credence in it being Wednesday tomorrow may
be 1/2 even though your expected Wednesday credence in it being Wednesday
1 Proof: let E1, . . . , En be a partition of the evidence you might receive at t2 such that
E and E′ fall in the same cell of the partition iff P1(A | E) = P1(A | E′). For
each i ≤ n, let xi = P1(A | E), where E is any member of Ei. By the law of
total probability, P1(A) =
∑
i
P1(Ei) × xi. If you know that you update by (SC),
P1(Ei ↔ P2(A)=xi) = 1. Hence P1(A) =
∑
i
P1(P2(A) = xi) × xi, and you satisfy
(SR).
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is 1. In general, (SR) only holds if P2 is presented as ‘my credence at the
next point when information comes in’. A more accurate formulation would
therefore go like this: P1(A) =∑x P1(P (A) = x)×x. More generally, using
the n-shifted probability function from the previous section,
(SR) P1(nA) =
∑
x
P1(nP (A) = x)× x.
A nice illustration of these issues, which may also help to further clarify the
application of (SC), is Frank Arntzenius’s [2003] story of the prisoner. I will
look at the following variation.
The prisoner. A prisoner is waiting in her cell while a jury decides
whether she will be executed or banished. If she faces execution,
the lights in her cell get switched off at midnight. Aware of this
arrangement, the prisoner falls into a restless sleep from which she
briefly awakens at several points throughout the night. At each
awakening, she finds the lights in her cell still on.
To simplify the model, assume that the prisoner falls asleep at 8pm, and at this
point still knows what time it is. She also knows that each sleep phase takes
either one hour or two. Her initial credence is distributed at follows.
8pm 8pm 9pm 10pm 11pm 12am 1am 2am
Execution 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Banishment 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Since she does not know when she will wake up next, the two open pos-
sibilities divide into four sub-possibilities, depending on whether the next
sleep phase takes one hour or two. After the first awakening, her credence in
any of these four possibilities is shifted to the corresponding combination of
Execution/Banishment with 9pm/10pm.
1st awak. 8pm 9pm 10pm 11pm 12am 1am 2am
Execution 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 0
Banishment 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 0
At the second awakening, it could be 10pm, 11pm, or 12am. The combination
Execution & 12am is excluded by the evidence that the lights are still on. By
(SC), the new credence is2
2 Here is the update table:
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2nd awak. 8pm 9pm 10pm 11pm 12am 1am 2am
Execution 0 0 1/7 2/7 0 0 0
Banishment 0 0 1/7 2/7 1/7 0 0
At the third awakening, the probability of Execution has further decreased:
3rd awak. 8pm 9pm 10pm 11pm 12am 1am 2am
Execution 0 0 0 1/9 0 0 0
Banishment 0 0 0 1/9 1/3 1/3 1/9
At the fourth awakening, she is certain that she will be banished.
The prisoner’s credence gradually spreads over larger and larger intervals of
time: it spans n hours after the nth awakening. This is not due to any cognitive
failures, but simply to the fact that she lacks information about how much time
passes between the awakenings. Her situation resembles that of a time traveller
who enters a time machine not knowing how far it will take her into the past or
the future.
As Arntzenius points out, the prisoner appears to violate Reflection. For
suppose she is aware of her update policy; then she knows at 8pm that by 11pm,
her credence in Banishment will be either 1/2 or 4/7 or 8/9, depending on
whether there will be one, two or three awakenings until then. The expectation
of her 11pm credence is therefore greater than 1/2. In general, whatever her
credence in Banishment is at 8pm, the expectation of her 11pm credence is
greater (unless the 8pm credences is 1). The prisoner cannot trust her future
self!
The problem here is that the future credence is picked out in an illegitimate
way, as the credence at 11pm. By contrast, consider the prisoner’s expectations
about her beliefs after two awakenings. Her credence in Banishment will then
either be 4/7 (if the lights are still on) or 0 (if the lights are off). Since the
E 10 E 11 E 12 B 10 B 11 B 12
1/4 E 9 1/2 1/2 0 0 0 0
1/4 E 10 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 0
1/4 B 9 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
1/4 B 10 0 0 0 0 1/2 1/2
Shifting: 1/8 1/4 1/8 1/8 1/4 1/8
Conditioning: 1/7 2/7 0 1/7 2/7 1/7
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probability that the lights will be off by the second awakening is 1/8, the
expectation of the future credence in Banishment is 4/7× 7/8 = 1/2.3
To understand why Reflection fails if the future credence is picked out by a
definite time, note that the prisoner knows something about her situation at
11pm that she will not know when she is there: that it is located at 11pm. If you
trust someone’s judgement while possessing information they lack, you should
not endorse their unconditional judgement, but their (expected) conditional
judgement, conditional on the further information you possess about their
situation. The prisoner’s 11pm credence in Banishment conditional on it being
11pm is 1/2. Curiously, the “further information” the prisoner has about her
future self is not some interesting fact about the world. The prisoner knows
that her 11pm successor is located at 11pm simply because that is how she
picks her out.
Reflection relates the present credence to the expected future credence. We
can also relate the present credence to earlier credence. In this case, it is
obviously quite common that the agent has relevant information that she
previously lacked. Among self-aware agents who follow conditioning, the later
credence therefore matches the expectation of the previous credence conditional
on the new evidence:
( R) P2(A) =
∑
x
P2(P1(A |E) = x)× x.
The shifted version is
(S R) P2(A) =
∑
x
P2(P1(A | E) = x)× x.
As before, it is easy to verify that self-aware agents who follow (C) or (SC)
satisfy the corresponding principle of inverse Reflection – though again we have
3 Arntzenius mentions a related puzzle. Suppose the prisoner knows in advance what her
credence will be at 11pm. Then she could use her beliefs as a clock: she could figure out
whether it is 11pm merely by introspecting if she has the relevant beliefs. Does this mean
that self-awareness is incompatible with losing track of the time? No. If you know what
update policy you follow and what evidence you will receive, then you know what your
credence will be at each point when information arrives. But you need not know how these
“points when information arrives” map onto what is measured by our clocks. (Again, think
of the time traveler who does not know where the time machine will take her.)
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to be careful that P1 is picked out in the right way: as the credence just before
the present information came in.4
4 Conditioning revisited
Many arguments have been put forward in support of conditioning, showing
that it is the only update rule with certain desirable features. Once we allow
propositions to change their truth-value, it turns out that these arguments
actually support shifted conditioning. I will demonstrate this for three well-
known, and hopefully representative examples: an argument from coherence,
an argument from Reflection, and an argument from minimal revision.
The first argument, due to Lewis [1999] and first published in [Teller 1973],
might be summarised as follows. Imagine you know that tomorrow you will
find out (for certain) whether or not E obtains. In response to this, you plan to
update your credence from P1 to either PE or P¬E accordingly. Let A be any
proposition, and consider an arrangement that will cost you a certain amount
of money x tomorrow if it turns out that E&¬A, and that will pay you 1− x
if it turns out that E&A. (You neither gain nor lose if ¬E.) For what values
of x do you judge this arrangement to have positive expected payoff for your
future self?
On the one hand, the expected payoff is −x×P1(E&¬A)+(1−x)×P1(E&A),
which is greater than 0 iff x < P1(E&A)/P1(E). On the other hand, if tomorrow
you find out E and thus update your credence to PE , the arrangement will
be worth −x × PE(¬A) + (1 − x) × PE(A) to you; so today’s estimate of
tomorrow’s value is P1(E) times that amount. This is positive iff x < PE(A).
The two answers are compatible only if PE(A) equals P1(E&A)/P1(E). Hence
to avoid having “contradictory opinions about the expected value of the very
same transaction” [Lewis 1999: 405], you should plan to update your credence
by conditioning.
More precisely, if PE(A) comes apart from P1(A |E), you effectively plan to
update your credence in such a way that your future self will be mistaken (by
4 Proof for (SC): suppose you have just received the information E. Your new credence
y in A then equals your previous credence in A conditional on E. Being aware of
both your present credence and your update policy, you can conclude that your previous
credence in A conditional on E was y. So P2(P1(A | E) = y) = 1 and P2(A) =∑
x
P2(P1(A | E) = x)× x.
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your present lights) about the expected cost of the arrangement. Pace Lewis,
this is not quite a contradictory state of mind, but it is certainly peculiar. As a
corollary, you will be susceptible to a Dutch Book: a clever bookie who knows
nothing more than you could make a sure profit by selling you bets on the
expected cost today and tomorrow in combination with a low stake bet against
E.
If propositions can change their truth-value, this argument becomes invalid:
the arrangement’s outcome depends on whether or not E and A are true
tomorrow; but in calculating the expected payoff as −x× P1(E&¬A) + (1−
x) × P1(E&A), we have used the probability of E and A now. If these
propositions can change their truth-value, we get the wrong result. For example,
if tomorrow I find out that it is sunny, I will come to believe that the washing
in the garden is dry. Nevertheless, since I only just hung it out, my current
conditional credence in the washing being dry given that it is sunny is rather
low. What is high is my conditional credence in the washing being dry tomorrow
given that it is sunny tomorrow. The arrangement’s actual expected payoff is
−x× P1((E&¬A)) + (1− x)× P1((E&A)), which is greater than zero iff
x < P1((E&A))/P1(E). Thus what the coherence argument really shows
is that your updated credence PE(A) should equal your conditional shifted
credence P1(A | E).
The next argument is an argument from Reflection. This time, we start with
the assumption that under ideal conditions, one should trust the judgement of
one’s better-informed future self, as expressed by the Reflection principle
(R) P1(A) =
∑
x
P1(P2(A) = x)× x.
As [van Fraassen 1999] shows, if an agent satisfies (R), then (under further weak
assumptions) they cannot plan to update their credence by any rule other than
conditioning.
Van Fraassen’s proof remains valid if centered propositions are allowed, but
Reflection itself becomes implausible. As argued in the previous section, trusting
one’s future self is then better expressed as
(SR) P1(A) =
∑
x
P1(P (A) = x)× x.
(SR) is supported by a Dutch Book argument very similar to Lewis’s; but here
we just take it as a starting point. Following van Fraassen, we can turn it into
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another argument for (SC): suppose an agent satisfies (SR) and is about to
learn (for certain) whether E or ¬E, upon which she will update her credence
to PE or P¬E accordingly. Suppose also she knows this. Then for any world
w, P1(w) = P1(E) × PE(w) + P1(¬E) × P¬E(w). If E is true at w,
then P¬E(w) = 0 and P1(w) = P1(E) × PE(w). Moreover, P1(w) =
P1(E) × P1((w&E))/P1(E); hence PE(w) = P1((w&E))/P1(E) =
P1(w | E). On the other hand, if E is not true at w, then PE(w) = 0 and
P1(w | E) = 0, so again PE(w) = P1(w | E). So PE results from P1 by
(SC).
Finally, I want to look at an argument from minimal revision. Suppose you
consider two theories A and B to be equally probable. If both theories predict
E, then after finding out that E (and nothing else), you should not judge A to
be more probable than B. That is,
(MR) if A and B entail E, and P1(A) = P1(B), then PE(A) = PE(B).
[Teller 1973: 225–232] proves that conditioning is the only general rule for PE
that satisfies this constraint. (See [Williams 1980] and [Diaconis and Zabell
1982] for related results.)
(MR) entails that in the absence of relevant evidence, credence does not
change. Again, this is not quite right if the world itself can change. If A says
that E is true now and false afterwards, while B says that E is always true,
then A and B both entail E; but when in a few moments you find out E, you
have found strong evidence against A, and not against B. We should therefore
replace (MR) by a shifted version:
(SMR) If A and B entail E, and P1(A) = P1(B), then PE(A) = PE(B).
For uncentered A and E, (SMR) reduces to (MR), just as (SR) reduces to (R).
It is easy to show that shifted conditioning satisfies (SMR): if A and B entail E,
then P1((A&E)) = P1(A) and P1((B&E)) = P1(B), hence if P1(A) =
P1(B), then P1((A&E))/P1(E) = P1((B&E))/P1(E). The converse,
that no other policy satisfies (SMR), can be proved by straightforward but
tedious adaptation of the proof in [Teller 1973].
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5 Indirect conditioning
I now want to compare shifted conditioning to a family of alternatives that
have become popular in the debate on Sleeping Beauty. The basic idea is to use
old-fashioned conditioning, but somehow restrict it to uncentered propositions.
Return once more to The Litmus Test, and consider the proposition E that
specifies your total evidence after you have dipped the paper into the liquid. E
is a very rich proposition. It contains information not just about the paper’s
colour, but also about the beaker, the table, the lighting, your state of hunger,
and so on. You may reasonably think that E is true at most once in the history
of the universe: other people at other places or times may also dip papers into
beakers, but unless their environment and inner state mysteriously duplicates
your present situation, the total evidence they receive will be different. So
suppose you rule out worlds where E is true more than once. Your uncentered
beliefs are then divided between worlds where E occurs once and worlds where
E occurs never. By learning E, you can rule out worlds of the first kind. But
you also know where in the remaining worlds you are: you must be at the very
place and time where E occurs.
To make this precise, let ‘somewhere A’ be true at a world w iff A is true at
some place and time in the universe of w. ‘Somewhere A’ is the strongest uncen-
tered proposition entailed by A – uncentered insofar as it does not distinguish
between different centers within the same universe. Let ‘A at B’ be shorthand
for ‘somewhere B, and everywhere, B ⊃ A’, where ‘everywhere’ abbreviates
‘not somewhere not’. Thus ‘A at B’ is true iff A holds at every place in the
world where B holds, and there is at least one such place. Figure 1 should
help to clarify these notions. Assuming that P1 gives zero credence to worlds
where E is true more than once, we can then express the policy of indirect
conditioning as follows:
(IC) P2(A) = P1(A at E | somewhere E).
This takes the initial credence function P1, rules out all worlds where E
occurs nowhere, and moves the center in the remaining worlds to the point
where E occurs (of which, by assumption, there will never be more than one).
Renormalising yields the new probability P2. In other words, (IC) conditions the
uncentered fragment of P1 on the uncentered fragment of E and re-introduces
the centers as the point where E is true. In very broad outline, this is the policy
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A B
somewhere A
A at B
Figure 1: uncentered propositions in centered logical space. The grid
partitions the space of worlds by the worldmate relation: two worlds
are in the same cell iff they agree in what they say about the universe as
a whole. ‘Somewhere A’ and ‘A at B’ express uncentered propositions
about the universe, even though A and B are centered.
recommended in [Halpern 2006], [Meacham 2008], [Titelbaum 2008], [Kim 2009],
and, though less explicitly, [Elga 2000] and [Elga 2004].
Here is another way to motivate the proposal. Suppose at time t2 you are
confident that a certain self-locating proposition L is true here and now, and
nowhere else. (Think of L as something like “it is 8 am on 12 April 2009 and I am
standing at the corner of King’s Court, Southwark, London”.) Any proposition
A can then be mapped onto the corresponding uncentered proposition ‘A at L’
without affecting its probability at t2. If uncentered probabilities evolve by
conditioning, this determines the new probability for every proposition:
(IC′) P2(A) = P2(A at L) = P1(A at L |E at L).
To apply (IC′), we need a suitable self-locating certainty L. Presumably L
must come from the new evidence; at least it can’t have been learnt by (IC′).
But if E entails L, and possibilities with multiple occurrences of E are ruled
out, then ‘E at L’ reduces to ‘somewhere E’; so (IC′) is a special case of (IC).
Moreover, if we are liberal about the propositions that can take the place of L,
we can always plug in E itself, making (IC′) equivalent to (IC).
There is an obvious resemblance between (SC) and (IC′). Both apply condi-
tioning to a shifted transformation of the previous credence. (IC′) shifts the
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probability of any world w to wherever L holds within the same universe; (SC)
shifts it to the next point at w where information comes in.5
To see how (SC) and (IC) can come apart, assume that A is known not to
change its truth-value over time. According to shifted conditioning, an evidence
proposition E raises the probability of A only if A makes it sufficiently likely that
E will be encountered next: P2(A) > P1(A) iff P1(A | E) > P1(A). According
to indirect conditioning, E confirms A as long as A makes it likely that E
occurs at some point or other in the history of the world: P2(A) > P1(A) iff
P1(A | somewhere E) > P1(A). For example, consider the following hypothesis.
Eternal Life. You will live a very long life, in the course of which
you will have almost every humanly possible experience.
Your current credence in Eternal Life is presumably low. However, let E be
any experience you may have later today. Conditional on Eternal Life, the
probability of E occurring at some point or other is very high, whereas it is
much lower on more normal assumptions about your life. If you follow (IC),
any experience whatsoever will increase your credence in Eternal Life.
(SC) does not have this unwelcome consequence, since it only considers what
Eternal Life predicts about your very next experience, on which the hypothesis
is largely silent.6
For another example, consider an Everettian interpretation of quantum
mechanics on which the universe constantly branches, with every possible
outcome of every chance process occurring in some branch of the universe. To
avoid multiple occurrences of the evidence within a world, pretend that your
evidence is specific enough to always tell you at which branch you’re located.
Now suppose you are watching the clouds, and cloud formation is a chancy
process. On the Everettian theory, it was certain beforehand that in some
branch of the universe the clouds would gather in exactly the way you find
them. On alternative, “collapse” interpretations of quantum mechanics, the
clouds could well have gathered only in different ways. Your evidence therefore
5 [Kim 2009] even calls his version of (IC′) “Shifted Strict Conditionalization”. Understanding
(SC) as an improved version of (IC′) may justify keeping the label.
6 By ‘experience’ I here mean something like sensory experience, not things like being killed
in World War I. The example works best on a narrow conception of evidence, on which
evidence is closely aligned with (sensory or memory) experience. Otherwise parts of your
evidence that go beyond experience might e.g. tell against Eternal Life.
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never rules out any previously possible Everett universe, while it constantly
rules out previously possible universes with collapse. If you follow (IC), a few
hours of observing the clouds should strongly increase your credence in the
Everett interpretation.
In the previous section, we also saw that agents who deviate from (SC) must
violate certain principles of rationality such as (shifted) Reflection, Minimal
Revision, and immunity to Dutch Books. This is illustrated again by the
two examples. If you follow (IC), you know that any observation you make
today will increase your confidence in Eternal Life; hence your current credence
in this proposition does not equal the expectation of your better-informed
future credence: you violate Reflection. (Eternal Life does not change its
truth-value over time, so the reasons for moving to shifted Reflection do not
apply.) Moreover, if you bet in accordance with your beliefs, I can Dutch Book
you by selling you a wager against Eternal Life now and buying it back at a
reduced price later.
The root of these problems is that indirect conditioning is too revisionary
about self-locating information: it tells your later self to dismiss your former
beliefs about where in the world you are, even if the relevant self-locating
propositions were certain not to change their truth-value. If before looking
out of the window you knew that you live in the 21st century on Earth, (IC)
completely ignores this knowledge and tries to establish your new location from
scratch, based on the evidence you get from looking out of the window.
Yet more trouble emerges if we allow for worlds where the evidence occurs
more than once. As presented so far, (IC) then collapses into contradiction.
For suppose at t1 you believe that E will occur on Monday and then again on
Tuesday. By (IC), learning E should make you certain that it is not Monday, as
the P1 probability of ‘Monday at E’ (that is, of ‘somewhere E, and everywhere,
E ⊃ Monday’) is zero. By the same reasoning, you should be certain that it is
not Tuesday. On the other hand, you should be certain that it is either Monday
or Tuesday! P2 ends up not being a probability distribution at all. (It does not
help to redefine ‘Monday at E’ as ‘somewhere, Monday & E’; then you should
become certain that it is both Monday and Tuesday.)
Now given the richness of our evidence, worlds where evidence propositions
are true more than once are strange. Can we dismiss the trouble cases as
far-fetched and content ourselves with a rule that works at least in normal
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situations (following [Titelbaum 2008] and [Stalnaker 2008: ch.3])? I don’t
think so. For one, the nature of our evidence is a contingent matter. It is
easy to imagine (or build) creatures whose evidence is rather sparse. More
importantly, the contradiction arises as soon as worlds with multiple occurrence
of the evidence are assigned non-zero credence. But how far-fetched is it to
assign non-zero credence e.g. to the hypothesis of eternal recurrence, on which
history keeps repeating itself? Indeed, statistical mechanics arguably entails
that the universe, if large enough, contains many short-lived duplicates of our
present brains, emerged from random collisions of atoms in outer space and time
(see [Albrecht and Sorbo 2004]); if evidence supervenes on brain states, these
so-called Boltzmann brains have the same evidence that we have. Similarly,
Everettian quantum mechanics arguably entails that many of our counterparts
in other branches of the universe have the same evidence that we have. It does
not matter whether these theories are true. What matters is that situations
where someone assigns them non-zero credence can hardly be dismissed as
far-fetched.
To allow for such cases, one may appeal to a principle of self-locating indif-
ference: if the present evidence is true at several points within a world, these
points should all get equal credence. (IC) might then be extended as follows.
As before, start by ruling out all worlds from the previous belief space where E
occurs nowhere. To re-introduce the centers, divide the probability assigned
to worlds where E occurs more than once evenly between all the E locations.
[Halpern 2006] considers something like this proposal. In effect, we re-interpret
‘P1(A at E)’ in (IC) as the expected ratio of A locations among E locations.
Another possibility, suggested in [Piccione and Rubinstein 1997] and [Elga 2000],
is to redistribute probability from worlds with fewer occurrences of E to worlds
with more of them, by multiplying the previous probability of each world with
the number of E locations it contains, dividing its probability evenly between
these locations, and renormalising the probability function.
Either way, the appeal to indifference leads to a new host of problems. What
if the number of possible centers within a world is infinite? Given a world of
(one-way) eternal recurrence, what is the “indifferent” probability for living in
an even-numbered epoch, or in a prime-numbered epoch? Any simple answer to
such questions quickly runs into contradiction. Worse, indifference is the high
road to skepticism. If you believe in statistical mechanics and hence that the
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universe may well contain legions of Boltzmann brains all of whom share your
present evidence, self-locating indifference requires you to be confident that you
are one of these brains. (Elga [2004] appears to welcome this consequence.)
Shifted conditioning has none of these problems. It gives the correct verdict
in cases like Eternal Life, it easily handles multiple occurrences of the evidence,
and it makes no use of indifference.7
6 Sleeping Beauty and diachronic rationality
Many recent proposals on updating and self-location have been developed in
response to the Sleeping Beauty problem. A quick reminder:
Sleeping Beauty. While Sleeping Beauty is asleep on Sunday
night, a fair coin is tossed. If the coin lands tails, Beauty’s memories
of Monday will be erased on Monday night. If the coin lands heads,
her memories aren’t erased, but she is made to sleep all through
Tuesday. Beauty knows of this arrangement before she goes to bed
on Sunday.
The “problem” is what Beauty should believe about the outcome of the coin
toss when she wakes up on Monday.
There are two reasons why I haven’t discussed this case yet. One is its
strangeness. Self-location spells trouble for conditioning in simple, everyday
situations like The Litmus Test; we don’t need to look at far-fetched puzzle cases
that no-one ever encounters. More importantly, while it is pretty clear what
rationality demands in The Litmus Test or Eternal Life, there is considerable
disagreement about Sleeping Beauty. This makes Sleeping Beauty rather ill-
suited as a starting point or test case for a general model.
The other reason why I have so far ignored Sleeping Beauty is that it com-
bines two issues that are better kept apart: self-location and memory loss (or
7 A problem somewhat parallel to multiple occurrences of the evidence arises for shifted
conditioning if there can be multiple “next” points where information arrives. As it stands,
shifting is undefined in such cases. Whether such cases are possible depends on somewhat
controversial assumptions in the epistemology of fissioning subjects. Personally, I think
they are possible, and I have worked on an extension of the present framework to deal
with them. Due to space constraints, I have to leave this for another occasion.
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“imperfect recall”). I will get back to this in a minute. First let’s see what
happens if Beauty follows (SC).
If Beauty follows (SC), her Monday credence in Heads equals her Sunday
credence in Heads conditional on E, where E is her evidence on Monday.
Assuming that her Sunday credence in Heads was 1/2 and E is irrelevant to
the outcome of the coin toss, P2(Heads) = P1(Heads | E) = 1/2. But this
is not the traditional “halfer” solution. On Sunday, Beauty was also confident
that her next awakening would take place on Monday. Hence upon awakening,
Beauty is certain that it is Monday! Stranger still, since she is now certain that
her next awakening will take place on a Tuesday, she will be certain on Tuesday
that it is Tuesday!
You may wonder whether it is even possible for Beauty to satisfy these
demands. Imagine upon awakening on Monday morning, she wants to apply
(SC). To this end, she first has to figure out her previous beliefs. Once she
finds out that last night she believed that it is Sunday, she can infer that it is
now Monday. But how is she supposed to find out what she believed last night
unless she already knows that it is Monday? Indeed, if the coin lands tails, then
Beauty may well have the exact same evidence on Monday and on Tuesday;
and then this evidence can hardly lead her to one conclusion on Monday, and
to a different conclusion on Tuesday.
This worry rests on an evidentialist picture of rational belief. Evidentialism
is the doctrine that rational belief is never constrained by contingent matters
outside the agent’s present evidence (compare [Feldman and Conee 1985]).
Hence if Beauty has the same evidence on Monday and on Tuesday, rationality
cannot require her to have different beliefs.
Evidentialism has striking consequences for update policies. The policies
considered so far all determine the new beliefs from two factors: the previous
beliefs and the new evidence. But unless the previous beliefs are somehow part
of the new evidence (in which case they are redundant as an additional factor),
this puts constraints on the new beliefs that go beyond the agent’s new evidence.
An evidentialist policy would have to determine the new belief state entirely on
the basis of the new evidence, drawing on previous beliefs only to the extent
that they are recoverable from present evidence. Formally, such a policy is still
a function from previous beliefs P1 and evidence E to new beliefs P2, but it is
a degenerate function that completely ignores the input P1.
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The issue about evidentialism is somewhat muddled by the fact that people
mean all kinds of things by ‘evidence’. If you count anything as evidence
to which a belief state is rationally sensitive, then evidentialism is true by
definition. Obviously, (SC) cannot clash with a definition. To bring out the
anti-evidentialist consequences of (SC), ‘evidence’ should be used for something
that might uncontroversially be the same between Beauty’s state on Monday
and her state on Tuesday – something like sensory input, or sensory input
together with accessible memory.
Returning to the above worry, is it possible for agents to follow update policies
that are not evidentialist in this sense? It is. Consider a simple robot with
a camera and a database for storing information. When the camera delivers
new information, the information is added to the database. The robot’s update
mechanism thereby implements a non-evidentialist policy: the content of the
database is determined not only by the present evidence from the camera, but
also by what was written in the database before. To implement an evidentialist
policy, the robot would have to erase the database every time it receives new
information; the database content would always reflect just the present input
from the camera. (If you think the previous content of the database should
count as part of the robot’s evidence, let me stipulate that the database is
write-only: there is no way for the robot to read its contents.)
As the example illustrates, non-evidentialist update mechanisms have a great
advantage: they allow agents to maintain beliefs even when they are no longer
supported by present evidence. To the extent that the initial beliefs were well
supported, this typically leaves the agent with a more accurate representation of
her environment. Except in very unusual circumstances, (SC) easily outperforms
any evidentialist rival in terms of truth-tracking. This might explain why no
engineer would dream of implementing an evidentialist mechanism in a robot,
and why nature almost certainly hasn’t implemented one in us.
However, the worry about (SC)’s verdict on Sleeping Beauty might go deeper.
What if Beauty’s “memory erasure” affects not only her accessible memory, but
every aspect of her mental state? What if Beauty’s Tuesday morning state is
an exact copy of her Monday morning state if the coin lands tails? It is then
quite plausible (though not inevitable) that Beauty’s beliefs on Monday cannot
be different from her beliefs on Tuesday. So she cannot satisfy the demands of
(SC).
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This may be right, but it does not count against (SC) as a norm of diachronic
rationality. In a cognitive system that reliably implements (SC), the new belief
state must be causally sensitive to the previous state. If this causal sensitivity
is destroyed and the system is brought into a state completely unrelated to its
predecessors, it is only to be expected that the system will violate norms of
diachronic rationality.
What lies at the heart of this matter is whether there are any diachronic
norms of rationality at all, norms that directly relate an agent’s beliefs at one
time to her beliefs at another time. Evidentialism presumably rules out such
norms: according to evidentialism, rational belief may be constrained by present
evidence about previous belief, but it is unconstrained by previous belief itself.
Any belief state may be followed by any other, as long as the new state fits the
new evidence.
None of this has anything in particular to do with (SC). All the update norms
I have considered in this paper are genuinely diachronic. Conditioning, for
example, says that the agent’s new credence should equal her previous credence
conditional on the new evidence. It does not say that the new credence should
equal what the agent takes to be her previous credence, or what she can in
some way recall as her previous credence, conditional on the new evidence.
Conditioning relates the agent’s new credence to her actual previous credence,
not to any present trace of the previous credence.
I find it very plausible that there are diachronic norms of rationality, but
I have no hopes of proving this. If you disagree, you will easily find any
argument to the contrary invalid or question-begging – a fate that has befallen
every argument for conditioning. Trying to establish normative claims from
uncontested grounds is a futile exercise.
Nevertheless, I have something on offer even if you reject diachronic con-
straints on belief, and thus any form of conditioning. For you may still like a
corresponding principle of inverse Reflection. That is, you may agree that if an
agent knows that her previous self believed, say, that yew berries are poisonous,
then it is sensible for her to retain this belief, even without more direct evidence
for its content. The agent could thereby partake in the doxastic conservatism
that characterises followers of conditioning: she would tend not to change her
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mind on a subject matter unless she encounters relevant evidence.8
To handle centered propositions, I would recommend the shifted version of
inverse Reflection from section 3:
(S R) P2(A) =
∑
x
P2(P1(A | E) = x)× x.
This says that your credence in A should equal your estimate (formally, your
expectation) of your previous credence in A conditional on E, where E
is your present evidence. If this estimate coincides with the actual previous
credence – as it does when you possess complete and certain evidence about
your previous beliefs – then obeying (S R) has the same effect as following (SC),
and it enjoys the same advantages over the Reflection principles corresponding
to (C) and (IC).
Let me emphasise again that two independent issues are in play here. One
is whether there are genuinely diachronic constraints on rational belief. If not,
rules like conditioning or shifted conditioning can only be normative for agents
with perfect recall. For situations with imperfect recall, we should retreat to
the corresponding principle of inverse Reflection, ( R) or (S R). The second issue
is how conditioning should be modified to handle centered information. This
may look like a moot point if you reject diachronic norms of rationality anyway.
But the problems for conditioning also affect the principle of Reflection: if
propositions can change their truth-value, ( R) is just as unacceptable as (C).
My focus in this paper has been on the second issue. I have argued for (SC)
as an alternative to (C), and correspondingly for (S R) as an alternative to ( R).
In the case of Sleeping Beauty, (SC) says that Beauty should be confident on
Monday that it is Monday and on Tuesday that it is Tuesday – even if this is
impossible. ‘Ought’ does not always imply ‘can’. On the other hand, if we set
8 This form of conservatism is only distantly related to its more prominent namesakes,
discussed e.g. in [Christensen 1994] and [Vahid 2004]. It says nothing about the justificatory
status of beliefs. By recommending conservative policies, I do not claim that unjustified
beliefs can become justified merely by being retained. Nor is it a mark of conservatism,
as I use it, that one always regards the fact that one used to believe p as evidence for p.
This is impossible: let q be a proposition that entails that you used to believe ¬q (such
as a typical skeptical scenario); the conditional probability of ¬q given that you used to
believe ¬q then cannot exceed the unconditional probability of ¬q; hence the fact that you
used to believe ¬q cannot possibly be evidence for ¬q. More generally, on my usage, a
conservative agent need not have any evidence or opinions about her previous beliefs at all.
24
aside diachronic norms, or norms that are impossible for an agent to obey, we
may look to the synchronic norm (S R). (S R) does not settle the answer to the
Sleeping Beauty problem. However, if we assume that Beauty is not certain
on Monday that it is Monday, (S R) entails that her credence in Heads should
be less than 1/2. Combined with a principle of self-locating indifference, (S R)
yields the traditional “thirder” solution.9
7 Conclusion
Let me wrap up. I have proposed a modified form of conditioning as a general
rule for updating centered beliefs. Like conditioning, the rule is conservative: by
default, old beliefs are carried over to the new state; a belief is dropped (loosely
speaking) only if it either conflicts with the new evidence or was expected to
become false due to changes in the world. The second clause distinguishes the
modified rule, shifted conditioning, from standard conditioning.
When centered propositions are ignored, shifted conditioning reduces to condi-
tioning. More specifically, the two coincide whenever P1(A |E) = P1(A | E):
when the present probability of A conditional on E equals the probability of A
being true in the near future given that E is true in the near future.
Like conditioning, shifted conditioning has a synchronic counterpart (a prin-
ciple of inverse Reflection) that imposes no diachronic constraints on belief. For
agents with perfect information about their previous beliefs, the two coincide.
Otherwise agents who follow shifted conditioning will usually end up with a
more accurate representation of their environment than agents who merely obey
the synchronic counterpart.
9 By the law of total probability, P (H) = P (H |Mon)× P (Mon) + P (H |Tue)× P (Tue). If
it is Monday, then the previous probability of Heads was 1/2, and so was the previous
probability that Heads will be true conditional on E. Hence by (S R), P (H |Mon) = 1/2.
Since P (H |Tue) = 0, the probability of Heads is 1/2× P (Mon). This line of reasoning
parallels the argument against the halfer solution in [Titelbaum 2008] and [Kim 2009],
where the Reflection principle corresponding to (IC) is used in place of (S R).
I have assumed that Beauty’s Tails-Tuesday state is a successor of her Tails-Monday
state. Given the “memory erasure”, it might be preferable to regard the Tails-Tuesday
state as a direct successor of Beauty’s Sunday state. The Sunday state would then have
two successors, one on Monday and one on Tuesday. With the adjustments mentioned in
footnote 7, both (SC) and (S R) then lead to the traditional “halfer” solution.
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Unlike many proposals in the AGM tradition (following [Katsuno and Mendel-
zon 1991]), my account makes no assumptions about how the world will evolve.
It is not assumed, for example, that the most probable future is exactly like
the present. Unlike many proposals in the Bayesian tradition (such as [Halpern
2006], [Titelbaum 2008], [Meacham 2008] or [Kim 2009]), my account assigns
no special status to uncentered beliefs or uncentered propositions. Uncentered
beliefs are simply beliefs with a particular subject matter; a subject matter that
does not distinguish between locations within any possible universe.
I have argued that shifted conditioning gives the correct verdict in everyday
cases like The Litmus Test and The Prisoner as well as in cases like Eternal
Life that pose problems for alternative proposals. I have also shown how several
well-known arguments in favour of conditioning support shifted conditioning
once centered propositions are taken into account.
I do not claim that shifted conditioning is the only rational way to change
one’s mind. It might be better to magically align one’s beliefs with the truth,
irrespective of the evidence and the previous beliefs. And I suppose there should
be room for rationally revising one’s beliefs without receiving any relevant
evidence, as when one finds a new theory that better explains the available
data.
In these respects, shifted conditioning shares whatever burden lies on standard
conditioning; the only improvement is that it adequately handles centered
propositions. I think of shifted conditioning as an ideal conservative policy – a
conservative policy that does not lose track of changes in the world.
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